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Abstrat
In this paper, we analyze the eet of the riminal justie system on
juvenile reidivism. Using a unique sample of German inmates, we are able to
disentangle the seletion into riminal and juvenile law from the subsequent
reidivism deision of the inmate. We base our identiation strategy on
two distint methods. First, we jointly estimate seletion and reidivism in
a bivariate probit model. In a seond step, we use a disontinuity in law
assignment reated by German legislation and apply a (fuzzy) regression
disontinuity design. In ontrast to the bulk of the literature, whih mainly
relies on US data, we do not nd that the appliation of riminal law inreases
juvenile reidivism. Rather, our results suggest that sentening adolesents
as adults redues reidivism in Germany.
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1 Introdution
Crime has been a major problem in all soieties throughout time. However, there
is still no lear answer to the debate on optimal riminal legislation. From an
eonomist's perspetive rime an be seen as the result of rational behavior. A-
ording to this approah, whih goes bak to Beker (1968), it is individually
rational to ommit a rime if illegal inome opportunities outweigh the legal ones.
Hene, legislation should result in severe punishments inreasing the expeted osts
of rime and thus augmenting general deterrene. However, one an individual has
been aught oending, the goal shifts to minimizing the probability of the individ-
ual re-oending, or spei deterrene. This reveals a potential dilemma: While
the optimal punishment should result in osts high enough to deter potential of-
fenders, it should not diminish the oender's hanes of re-entering the legal labor
market ex post. In the ase of inareration, dierent riminogeni hannels have
been identied. Western et al. (2001) summarize the literature on labor market
onsequenes of inareration. Their results support the hypothesis that inmates
suer from stigma whih is reeted in redued future earnings. Further, inar-
eration an inrease the individual payos from rime by induing a taste for
violene (Banister et al., 1973) or other peer eets (Bayer et al., 2009; Glaeser
et al., 1996). Thus, the severeness of punishment an have opposing eets.
This ambivalene is of partiular importane if delinquents suer from some
kind of myopia - or simply do not orretly antiipate their future inome oppor-
tunities - and ommit rimes even though a fully rational ator would not have
taken this deision. Youths seem to be espeially prone to this kind of behavior.
The literature on personal development found that they suer from a maturity
gap (Mott, 1993) whih temporarily inreases their inlination towards rimi-
nal ativity (e.g. Thornberry et al., 2004). This leads to the belief that juveniles
are more rehabilitatable and less ulpable than adults (Mears et al., 2007). As a
onsequene, in the ase of young oenders the general deterrene eet of harsh
sentenes is limited while the eet on reintegration into the legal job market gains
relative importane.
In many ountries, this line of thought led to a speial treatment of juvenile
2
oenders.
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However, in the last deades, an inreasing number of serious and
highly aggressive ats of juvenile violene have alled this poliy into question
(see Aebi, 2004; Oberwittler and Höfer, 2005). The most prominent reations
ome from the US, where dereasing publi support for a preferential treatment of
minors resulted in tougher laws transferring more juvenile oenders to a riminal
ourt (Moon et al., 2000). In Germany, the reent and ongoing overage of violent
rimes in the media has resulted in a strong pressure on politis (Bundestag, 2009)
and leading riminologists (Heinz, 2008) to address the question of how to deal
with juvenile and adolesent oenders.
German survey data seems to suggest a higher rate of reidivism of those sen-
tened under juvenile law. Jehle et al. (2003) analyzed the oial register survey
data on reidivism for the years 1994 to 1998. The reidivism rate within four
years after unonditional prison sentene under juvenile law was 79.0%, whereas
it was 43.6% for those sentened under riminal law. Does this mean that juve-
nile law has failed in Germany? Of ourse, desriptive statistis do not allow for
ausal interpretation and inferene, espeially, sine the unonditional propensity
to reoend might be systematially dierent in the two groups.
In this paper, we use data from a German prison survey to identify the treat-
ment eet of riminal law on juvenile reidivism. Our ontribution to the liter-
ature is twofold. First, we base our researh on German data, providing one of
the few miro-level studies on the drivers of juvenile reidivism outside the US.
Seond, we apply modern eonometri tehniques to ontrol for the suspeted se-
letion bias. Speially, we take take advantage of the German legal framework
for young oenders: The appliation of riminal law is possible if the oender was
aged 18 or over when ommitting the rime and beomes mandatory upon turning
21. In the disretionary phase between 18 and 21, the hoie of whih law to apply
is delegated to the judges allowing for individual deisions based on the oender's
harateristis. In our rst approah, we look at individuals in the disretionary
phase and perform a simultaneous maximum likelihood estimation of seletion
and treatment equation. In a seond approah, we use the step funtion in law
1
The Illinois Juvenile Court At of 1899 marks the beginning of an organized juvenile ourt
system in the USA (Bishop and Deker, 2006, p. 17). In Germany, ourts started developing
speial ourt hambers dealing with young delinquents in 1908 while the Juvenile Justie At
(JJA  Jugendgerihtsgesetz) was passed in 1923 (Dünkel, 2006, p. 226).
3
assignment for a regression disontinuity analysis assuming a random distribution
of individuals around the ut-o points.
Our ndings show that adolesents sentened as adults have a lower self-
reported probability of reidivism than those sentened as juveniles. This result is
obtained in both identiation strategies and persists in several robustness heks.
We explain our results by transatlanti dierenes of the legal framework. In Ger-
many (and in big parts of ontinental Europe) both law assignment struture and
prison onditions are substantially dierent as ompared to the Anglo-Saxon world,
questioning the external validity of US ndings. In fat, ombining our ndings
with US studies we postulate a U-shaped pattern between severity of punishment
and reidivism, where Germany lies to the left and the US to the right of the
minimum.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Setion 2 summarizes
the related literature. Setion 3 desribes the database and provides summary
statistis from the sample. Setion 4 provides the empirial speiation. Setions
5 and 6 desribe the identiation strategies and report the results of our two
alternative approahes, namely bivariate probit and regression disontinuity. In
setion 7 we disuss the results and setion 8 onludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Empirial Evidene
The empirial literature has studied the inuene of juvenile law on both general
and spei deterrene. We start out by looking at the empirial evidene on
general deterrene. The literature provides an ambiguous answer to the question
of whether transferring juveniles to riminal ourts deters any would-be oender
(see Redding (2006) for a good survey on this eld). Levitt (1998) found inreased
general deterrene when transferring adolesents to adult ourts. This would sug-
gest rational behavior of the youths onrming the Beker hypothesis. However,
other studies have found no general deterrene eet (Singer and MDowall, 1988;
Steiner et al., 2006) or even inreased arrest rates (Jensen and Metsger, 1994). In
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a more reent paper, Lee and MCrary (2009) found evidene that young adults
hardly respond to the harsher punishments they fae upon turning 18. They argue
that young oenders misjudge likelihood and severity of the imminent punishments
and an thus be haraterized as myopi. In summary we an say that even though
there is no lear answer, the more reent - and perhaps more sophistiated - studies
onrm the behavioral ndings mentioned above questioning the rational oender
hypothesis for the ase of juvenile delinquents.
With respet to spei deterrene there is muh learer evidene. The major-
ity of the studies using US data nd that trying and sentening juvenile oenders
as adults inreases the likelihood that they will reoend. Fagan (1996) studied
dierenes in reidivism rates of 15- and 16-year-old juveniles, taking advantage
of the fat that in New Jersey young delinquents were sentened by a juvenile
ourt while in New York they appeared before a riminal ourt. He found signi-
antly lower reidivism rates for those sentened by juvenile ourts, suggesting that
the speial jurisprudene for juvenile rimes is an eetive measure. Confronted
with the ritique that the results might be driven by a seletion bias, Kuphik
et al. (2003) repliated the study inluding several ontrol variables onrming
the original results. In a related study, Bishop et al. (1996) analyzed reidivism
in Florida, where the transfer of delinquents depends on the deision of the pros-
eutor. They found higher reidivism rates for those delinquents transferred to
riminal ourts. Again, they ould not rule out the existene of a seletion bias
distorting the results. However, in a follow-up study Lanza-Kadue et al. (2005)
still found a positive eet of transfers when using both a riher dataset and math-
ing tehniques. Further studies by Myers (2003), Podkopaz and Feld (1995) and
Thornberry et al. (2004) point into the same diretion.
Summarizing, the empirial evidene is mainly US-based and generally sup-
ports the laim that the appliation of riminal law inreases juvenile reidivism.
However, it is questionable whether these ndings are also valid for Germany due
to substantial dierenes in the legal systems. In partiular, most of the US stud-
ies ompare minors that are either sent to a riminal or a juvenile ourt. The
German legal system does not allow for suh a situation, as summarized in the
next subsetion.
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2.2 Juvenile Law in Germany
In Germany, juvenile law is mandatory for all minors, i.e. for all persons who have
not yet turned 18 at the time the riminal at was ommitted. For adolesent
delinquents, i.e. those aged between 18 and 21 years when oending, the legislator
left the deision to the ourts whether to apply juvenile or riminal law. In more
detail, ourts are asked to apply juvenile law whenever the oender ats equal to
a juvenile regarding moral and mental development at the time of the at ( 105
(1) Juvenile Justie At  Jugendgerihtsgesetz). Finally, delinquents of at least
21 years have to be sentened under riminal law. Comparing this fat with the
US pratie, we nd no state where the maximum age of appliation of juvenile
law has been extended as far as in Germany. In 2006, the automati treatment as
an adult started either at age 18 (37 states), age 17 (10 states) or age 16 (3 states)
(see Bishop and Deker, 2006, p. 13). Summarizing, German legislation allows for
a muh wider appliation of juvenile law than its US ounterpart. Similar regimes
an be found in other European ountries.
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A orret model for law assignment requires knowledge of the deision riteria.
Aording to Dünkel (2006) judges think strategially when hoosing whether to
apply riminal or juvenile law.
3
Juvenile law allows for milder santions, sine
ertain minimum penalties that exist in riminal law (e.g. 3 years in the ase of
robbery) do not have to be onsidered. Moreover, most juvenile reords get erased
after three years, while most riminal reords persist 5 years ( 34 Federal Central
Criminal Register Bundeszentralregister).
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Given this seletion proess, it seems
to be very likely that oenders seleted for juvenile law dier systematially from
2
In fat, 10 other European states use the same age barriers, while roughly 70% share the
stepwise transition from juvenile to riminal law. More than half of the European ountries
allow the appliation of juvenile law to oenders aged 18 and above. See Junger-Tas and Dünkel
(2009) for a more detailed desription of the dierent legal systems in Europe.
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The transferability of Dünkel's result might be limited sine he is looking at the whole range
of sentenes, while we only onsider inareration.
4
In partiular, entries have to be kept for the following time periods:
• juvenile registers: 3 years if sentene length does not exeed 1 year and 5 years otherwise,
• riminal registers: 3 years if sentene length does not exeed 3 months and 5 years other-
wise.
Moreover, for sexual oenses ten years for both adults and riminals. In all ases, sentene
length is added to these limits.
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those who are not, also in the expeted likelihood that they reidivate.
Moreover, the applied type of law also implies the type of ustody: either a
juvenile or a riminal prison.
5
Following Lange (2007) the most notable dierene
between the two failities is that riminal prisons have the primary goal of punish-
ment, while juvenile prisons are foused on soial eduation e.g. by the provision of
personal ustodians for the delinquents. Furthermore, aording to Dölling et al.
(2007), juvenile law is generally less stigmatizing as opposed to riminal law.
Entorf et al. (2008, p. 139-152) summarize dierenes of juvenile and riminal
prisons in Germany. The authors nd that, on average, juvenile prisons have more
money at their disposal and thus an oer a more onvenient and stimulating
environment. Juvenile prisons, for instane, oer more ommon rooms for eating,
sports and other ativities. Also, a higher fration of juvenile delinquents is plaed
in a single room (83%) as ompared to adult delinquents (55%). While in a
riminal prison there are less than 50 employees for 100 inmates, there are almost
70 employees in juvenile prisons. This allows juvenile prisons to provide shooling
opportunities and to oer more seminars, e.g. on how to deal with drug and alohol
problems.
The dierent failities an aet reidivism in two ways. On the one hand, being
an inmate in a more onvivial prison environment an dampen the deterrene eet
and lead to higher reidivism rates. On the other hand, juvenile prisons might
derease the likelihood of reidivism due to their eduational onerns and their
less stigmatizing eet on future job hanes. Our results will provide an answer
to the question of whih of the two eets dominates.
3 Data
Our analysis is based on a prison survey that was onduted in 31 German prisons
in 2003 and 2004, using a questionnaire with 123 questions.
6
It uses a two-stage ap-
proah ombining stratied and random sampling. First, a representative sample
5
 141 of German Penal Law (Strafvollzugsgesetz) requires separate prisons or at least in
separate departments of the same prison.
6
The survey was initiated and arried out by Horst Entorf and a team of researhers from
Darmstadt University of Tehnology.
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of the population of prisons in Germany was reated. Seond, a random seletion
from this population ompleted the sampling.
The questionnaire was given to 13,340 seleted inmates in either the German,
Turkish, Serbo-Croatian, Russian, Polish or English language to take aount of
the dierent nationalities of the inmates. All questionnaires within a prison where
handed out at the same point in time. It was ompleted by 1,771 respondents
resulting in a general response rate of 13.3%. For the sample of adolesents, whih
are the main interest group in our study (more information about our sample of
interest an be found below), the response rate equals 18.8%. This low response
rate - even though it is a standard problem when dealing with survey data - might
raise doubts about a potential seletion bias. However, when omparing sample
harateristis to those of the average prison population in Germany, there is no
evidene of a seletion bias.
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The original dataset an be grouped into three subsamples: inmates in pre-
trial ustody, inmates sentened under juvenile law and inmates sentened under
riminal law. Sine we are interested in the eet of the type of law applied, we
only use the last two subgroups. Further, our analysis fouses on adolesent delin-
quents. Hene, we also disregard all individuals younger than 14 and older than
25 when ommitting a rime. This leaves us with a sample of 245 inmates. When
estimating the treatment assignment funtion we further restrit the sample to
adolesents, yielding a subsample of 90 observations. The desriptive statistis for
both samples an be found in table 1.
3.1 Expeted Reidivism
Our target variable is a self-reported measure for expeted reidivism. Question-
naires were distributed by independent researhers and ompleted anonymously.
Therefore, the inmate did not have inentives to hide his true intentions. The
survey question was as follows:
Could it our that after your release from ustody you ome into onit with
the law and end up in prison?
7
For a more detailed analysis of this issue and the dataset in general see Entorf (2009).
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Table 1: Summary statistis
Sample 14 ≤ ageoense ≤ 25 18 ≤ ageoense ≤ 21
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
exp. reidivism 0.2531 0.4357 0 1 0.3 0.4608
riminal law 0.4939 0.501 0 1 0.1333 0.3418
ageoense 20.5276 2.666 14.5833 25 19.4546 1.0189
age 22.8796 3.2604 16.5 35.5 21.4222 1.63
german 0.8347 0.3722 0 1 0.7889 0.4104
high shool 0.0372 0.1896 0 1 0.0333 0.1805
soial ontat 0.5432 0.4992 0 1 0.5444 0.5008
poor soial apital 0.4898 0.5009 0 1 0.4556 0.5008
riminal family 0.1345 0.3419 0 1 0.1685 0.3765
prison experiene 0.2468 0.4321 0 1 0.2558 0.4389
prison years 0.7764 1.8874 0 10 0.5688 1.3791
riminal reord 3.7306 3.8876 0 30 3.8556 3.8147
job ontat 0.5043 0.5011 0 1 0.5116 0.5028
open 0.1639 0.371 0 1 0.1111 0.316
sentene length 3.5192 3.1234 0.0833 15 2.9963 2.0739
months in prison 16.1765 20.356 0 156 12.2159 12.6867
drugs 0.1633 0.3704 0 1 0.1556 0.3645
fraud 0.1837 0.388 0 1 0.2 0.4022
theft 0.3918 0.4892 0 1 0.3778 0.4875
robbery 0.2776 0.4487 0 1 0.3333 0.474
vandalism 0.0939 0.2923 0 1 0.1444 0.3535
Nobs 245 245 245 245 90 90
9
Inmates were asked to answer this question on a 5-point sale, where a 1 stands
for no, never and 5 orresponds to absolutely ertain. For reasons of small sam-
ple size, we translate the answers to this question into a binary variable reidivism.
In the data, the answers are positively skewed: 43.5% of the respondents answered
with the lower extreme no, never while only 4% said they were absolutely ertain
to reoend. Therefore, we set reidivism to zero if the respondent hose either an-
swer 1 or 2, and set the binary variable to one for those with a higher self-reported
probability of ending up in prison again (answers 3-5).
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One might raise objetions against using self-reported reidivism as a proxy for
real reidivism. There are at least three arguments in favor of our approah. First,
there is evidene that self-reported reidivism and real reidivism are orrelated
(Corrado et al., 2003). Seond, using expeted reidivism as ompared to atual
reidivism avoids the problem of a seletion bias when onduting a follow-up
survey to ollet atual reidivism. Third, atual reidivism an be driven by
post-release fators that might be hard to ontrol for.
Nevertheless, we want to explore potential problems of measurement error in
our dependent variable. A general bias, aeting all individuals in the same way
and resulting in a generally too high (or too low) rate of reidivism, would not
pose a threat to the validity of the estimated treatment eet of riminal law. Our
results lose validity, however, if individuals in the treatment group have a dierent
measurement error than those in the ontrol group. To generate suh an eet,
the applied law type must hange the preision of the self-reported measures. One
might suspet inmates in adult prisons to have a more preise estimate of their
future while those in juvenile prisons systematially over- or underestimate their
propensity to reidivate. Even though suh eets are not likely to drive the results,
we take this possibility into aount when disussing our ndings in setion 7.
3.2 Age at oense
As shown in setion 2.2, the age when ommitting the rime (ageoense) is ruial
for the assigned type of law. Sine this information did not appear in the survey
8
This strategy has been suggested and used by Entorf (2009). We also tried dierent ways
of bundling the original multinomial variable, whih did not hange the results.
10
diretly, we onstruted it using both time when surveyed and the time when the
rime was ommitted (both given at a monthly preision level). With regard to
the latter, inmates ould hoose to indiate either a point in time or an interval.
For a given point in time the alulation is straightforward. When dealing with
an interval, we use the end of the interval.
9
In addition, we have to deal with dierent preision levels of the relevant points
in time. Age when surveyed is reported in (ompleted) years, whih gives rise to
a possible error of nearly 12 months. In order to minimize this mistake we added
6 months to the alulated age at oense.
10
The missing preision of this variable
might threaten the regression disontinuity analysis, sine ageoense is the variable
that is ruial for the applied type of law. However, heking for ontraditions
with the treatment assignment mehanism onrms the plausibility of this variable.
Furthermore, our analysis relies on two independent identiation strategies and
the variable is only ruial for one of them.
3.3 Additional Regressors
Throughout the study we use several ontrol variables. First, we inlude personal
harateristis of the inmate, suh as age (at the time of the interview) and na-
tionality (aptured in the binary variable german). Also, shooling has been found
to be a determinant of juvenile rime whih an be explained by inapaitation
eets (Kruger and Berthelon, 2011) or by the assumption that eduation is a
positive asset in the legal labor market but of limited value for riminal ativities
(Entorf, 2009). In our sample, only very few inmates hold a German high shool
diploma equivalent Abitur (high shool). Only few inmates are married, whih
9
Aording to  32 Juvenile Justie At (Jugendgerihtsgesetz) judges have to stik to one
type of law when dealing with multiple oenses. The ruial fator is the age when ommitting
the main oenses. Laking a measure for severity in the data, we suspet the end of the interval
to be more important, sine judges might lak information on the start of the riminal ativity or
simply lend more weight to more reent oenses. We also used the mean as a robustness hek,
yielding similar results in the regressions and inreased inonsistenies in the age lassiations.
Based on these assumptions we think that our variable is the best available proxy for the real
age at oense.
10
Assuming a uniform distribution of the variable, the transformation allows for a redution
of the average mistake from 0.5 to 0.25.
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an be explained by the fat that we are only onsidering individuals aged 14 to
25 when ommitting the rime. A variable that might replae the marriage prop-
erty for young individuals is frequent ontat to a partner in the month before
inareration (soial ontat), whih holds true for roughly half of the inmates in
the sample. Further, we measure partiipation in soial lubs, e.g. sports lubs
or the voluntary re brigade, mapping the lak of ative partiipation into the
dummy variable poor soial apital. Almost half of the inmates in the sample re-
ported no ative partiipation in soial lubs. We also have information on the
riminal history of the inmate and ontrol for the number of oenses ommitted
before inareration (riminal reord), whether the inmate has been inarerated
before (prison experiene) and how muh time he/she has spent in prison (prison
years) in total. Criminal family bakground is another ingredient that ould mat-
ter for expeted reidivism: The dummy variable riminal family aptures past
onvitions of parents or siblings and applies for roughly every eighth inmate in
our sample.
Another interesting aspet are variables that ontrol for job opportunities. Job
ontat reports whether the inmate already has ontated employers, or already
has a job opportunity after leaving prison. More than half of the inmates fulll this
riterion. In addition, we inlude information on the type of sentene the inmate
is urrently serving. In terms of applied legislation, almost half of the delinquents
were santioned under riminal law. Roughly every sixth inmate in the sample is
transferred to an open institution. We also observe the individual sentene length
measured in years and how many months the inmate has already been in prison
(months in prison). In line with German legislation, we deem lifelong punishments
to be a 15-year sentene, whih represents the maximum length in our sample. The
group we are interested in most are the adolesents (18-21 years old).
Finally, we also have information on the type of oense that led to the present
inareration. It is likely that dierent types of rime are onneted with dierent
probabilities of reidivism. For instane for organized and drug-related rimes
there might be a higher probability of relapse due to physial addition and the
inuene of the soial network. Observe that inmates were allowed to report more
than one type of rime, whih means that the rime frequenies will not add up
to one. In our sample, the most frequently reported rime is theft, followed by
12
robbery, fraud, drug dealing (drugs) and vandalism.
4 Empirial Speiation
The goal of this study is to analyze the eet of being sentened under riminal
law (as opposed to juvenile law) on adolesent oenders' reidivism. Considering
riminal law to be a treatment that inuenes reidivism, this translates into the
identiation of the orresponding treatment eet. Dening ERi as a measure of
expeted reidivism and Ti ∈ {0, 1} as the treatment indiator of individual i, we
an write
ERi = (1− Ti)ER
0
i (Xi) + TiER
1
i (Xi). (1)
where ER0i (Xi) is expeted reidivism when juvenile law has been applied,
while ER1i (Xi) is expeted reidivism when riminal law has been applied. Both
expressions are a funtion of a list of variables Xi. As the treatment indiator is
a binary variable, its marginal eet an be represented by dierent onditional
means (see e.g. Hekman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). The most intuitive measure
is the average treatment eet (ATE), whih is simply the expeted dierene in
the outome variable onditional on the ovariates. Based on the setup in (1) and
dropping the observation index (i), this eet is dened by
ATE = E[ER1 − ER0|X ]. (2)
A related onept is the average treatment eet on the treated (ATET) whih
in our setup is dened by
ATET = E[ER1 − ER0|X, T = 1]. (3)
Note that both eets desribe a ounter-fatual outome and would require
the observation of the same individual in both situations, one reeiving the treat-
ment and one not reeiving it. Sine the two situations are mutually exlusive,
eah individual is observed only one. Hene, observational data only allow us to
ontrast the mean group outomes onditional on ovariates and treatment status.
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∆T = E[ER
1|X, T = 1]− E[ER0|X, T = 0] (4)
If treatment assignment is random and the sample is large enough, individuals
in both groups have idential harateristis and E[ERj |T = 1] = E[ERj |T =
0] = ERj for j ∈ (0, 1). In this ase, the three measures (2)-(4), oinide and
an be identied by a simple treatment dummy whose estimate is the sample
equivalent of ∆T . However, if treatment assignment is not perfetly random the
three measures an have dierent values.
First, if untreated oenders would respond dierently to the treatment, ATET
and ATE will diverge, whih we all a reation bias.
ATET = ATE + E[ER1 −ER0|X, T = 1]−E[ER1 − ER0|X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reation bias
(5)
Further, it is possible to rewrite (4) and deompose ∆T into a sum of the ATET
and a seletion bias.
∆T = E[ER
1 − ER0|X, T = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ATET
+ E[ER0|X, T = 1]− E[ER0|X, T = 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seletion bias
(6)
The seletion bias in (6) is dierent from zero, if treated and untreated indi-
viduals have a dierent general propensity to reidivate, even when ontrolling for
observables X . Put dierently, whenever law assignment is determined at least
in parts by the value of an unobserved variable whih is orrelated with expeted
reidivism, the sample analogue of ∆T annot identify a treatment eet. As An-
grist and Pishke (2009, p. 243) point out, this may reet some sort of omitted
variables bias, that is, a bias arising from unobserved and unontrolled dierenes
between the two groups.
Hene, we have to hek whether treamtent seletion inludes unobservable
variables. The global treatment assignment funtion (GTi) models the German
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legal framework ontaining a lear dependene on the age at oense:
GTi(ageoffense,Wi) =

0 if ageoffense < 18
Ti(Wi) if 18 ≤ ageoffense < 21
1 if ageoffense > 21
(7)
When restriting the sample to adolesents, ases with predetermined treat-
ment assignment based on age at oense disappear. In this ase, treatment as-
signment depends on a further set of variables (W ). As desribed in setion 2.2,
German juvenile law asks judges to apply a maturity riterion in the seletion pro-
ess. Sine maturity of the oender might also aet the likelihood of reidivism
we have to assume a seletion bias based on unobservable harateristis driving
both the ourt's treatment seletion and the outome variable.
In order to overome this seletion bias, we suggest two approahes that allow
us to identify the ausal eet of treatment. First, we dene a bivariate probit
model whih expliitly ontrols for treatment assignment and the emerging biases.
Seond, we apply a regression disontinuity framework whih relies on jumps in
the treatment assignment funtion to loally reestablish the random assignment
property.
5 Bivariate Probit Approah
Hekman (1978) proposed a general lass of simultaneous equation models with
endogenous variables to ontrol for a seletion bias. However, sine our target
variable reidivism is binary
11
, the OLS based estimator on the seond stage will
suer from trunation bias (see e.g. Greene and Hensher, 2010, p. 106). This alls
for the use of a binary hoie model on the seond stage also. Maddala (1983)
was one of the rst to extend Hekman's idea to a setting with two probit equa-
11
To use the original multinomial target variable for reidivism we would have to either assume
idential dierenes between the ategories and use OLS or use a multinomial ordered hoie
model. While the rst assumption seems too strong, the weakness of a multinomial model are
its ut-points that need to be estimated in addition to the target variable. This will hamper the
interpretation of the model oeients and redue eieny in a small sample whih made us
stik to the probit model. As a robustness hek we nevertheless estimated the equation using
an Ordered Probit model whih did not yield any substantially dierent results.
15
tions.
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In our ase, the strutural probit equation ontains expeted reidivism as
a funtion of regressors Xi and the potentially endogenous dummy for treatment
assignment
ER
j∗
i = X
′
iβ + Tiδ + εi and ER
j
i =
{
1 if ERj∗i > 0
0 otherwise
(8)
where j ∈ (0, 1) and the latent variable is denoted with a star (∗). The
seond (redued form) probit equation models treatment assignment as a funtion
of another set of ovariates (W
′
i).
T ∗i = W
′
iγ + ηi and Ti =
{
1 if T ∗i > 0
0 otherwise
(9)
However, it is neessary to impose an identifying restrition. In our ontext,
this an be the assumption of an exlusion restrition, meaning that there must
be at least one variable in W that is not inluded in X . We use ageoense for our
exlusion restrition, sine this age measure is relevant for treatment assignment,
but should have no diret eet on reidivism. Remember that ageoense ontains
the age at the oense whih aused the urrent inareration and does not represent
the age when the inmate started the riminal areer. Information on the riminal
history, whih might have an eet on reidivism, is ontrolled for in a seperate
variable (riminal reord).
In line with the standard bivariate model, we assume that the error terms of
both proesses, (8) and (9), share the following joint normal distribution[
εi
ηi
]
∼ N
([
0
0
]
,
[
1
ρ
ρ
1
])
(10)
where ρ aptures their orrelation. The joint density of the two error terms
12
A probit model (see Bliss, 1934) bases the binary outome on a latent funtion with a
normally distributed error term. A seond popular approah is the assumption of a logisti
distribution funtion. However, the analysis of a bivariate logit model is fairly inonvenient (see
e.g. Imai et al., 2007).
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then equals
φ (εi, ηi) =
1
2pi
√
1− ρ2
exp
[
−
1
2
(
ε2i + η
2
i − 2ρεiηi
1− ρ2
)]
. (11)
Correlation in the error terms, i.e. when ρ is not zero, poses a threat to the
validity of a single equation model and yields misleading estimates of ausal eets,
even after ontrolling for a full set of ovariates.
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A solution to this problem is a simultaneous Maximum Likelihood estimator
for both equations. An expression for the Log-Likelihood funtion an be found
e.g. in Maddala (1983, p. 123). The Maximum Likelihood estimation will not be
biased in the presene of the endogenous parameter in the rst equation as pointed
out by Greene and Hensher (2010, p.75).
Hene, we perform a simultaneous estimation of the two probit equations. The
results an be found in tables 2 and 3. In olumn 1, we test a very simple model
and nd a negative but only weakly signiant (p = 0.13) impat of riminal law on
reidivism. In olumn 2, we inlude individual harateristis that are frequently
found to explain reidivism in the literature. In olumn 3, we add further soio-
eonomi harateristis. In olumn 4, we inlude variables that ontrol for the
individual riminal history and the present type of prison, while in olumn 5 we
inlude dummies for the type of rime ommitted.
The inuene of riminal law on reidivism is always negative and does not
vary a lot aross the dierent model speiations. The estimated oeients lie in
eah other's ondene intervals yielding a very robust nding. The oeients of
the remaining ovariates are mainly in line with the literature and intuition, whih
gives further support for the estimated models. The estimate for the orrelation
between the two equations (rho) is signiant in olumns 3 to 5, whih show that a
single equation model would be biased. Given that the estimate of the orrelation
between the error terms is always positive, this parameter is also quite robust.
For the rst equation, we nd that age has a signiant (negative) inuene on
13
Based on the above density, we an replae the onditional expetations in
(6) whih allows us to rewrite the seletion bias as Pr
(
εi > −X
′
i
β|Xi, ηi > −W
′
i
γ
)
−
Pr
(
εi > −X
′
i
β|Xi, ηi ≤ −W
′
i
γ
)
.
Obviously, the two elements do not oinide if ε and η are not independent.
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Table 2: Biprobit Equation 1: Drivers of expeted reidivism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
reidivism reidivism reidivism reidivism reidivism
age -2.757** -3.321** -3.395** -2.823* -5.385***
(0.017) (0.042) (0.024) (0.090) (0.000)
age2 0.064** 0.077** 0.079** 0.066* 0.123***
(0.022) (0.038) (0.021) (0.086) (0.000)
riminal law -1.183 -1.566** -1.710*** -1.527*** -1.781***
(0.131) (0.034) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004)
job ontat -0.502*** -0.514*** -0.350*** -0.700***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
riminal family 0.449*** 0.376*** 0.381** 1.470***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.040) (0.008)
soial ontat 0.0998 -0.157 -0.761**
(0.791) (0.627) (0.016)
poor soial apital 0.435* 0.509** 0.877***
(0.054) (0.035) (0.004)
prison experiene -0.176 1.026
(0.763) (0.164)
prison years 0.254** 0.317**
(0.015) (0.030)
riminal reord 0.0200 0.0260
(0.536) (0.232)
open 0.930*
(0.094)
sentene length 0.078
(0.615)
months in prison -0.015
(0.549)
german 3.076***
(0.001)
high shool -2.096**
(0.037)
drugs 0.799**
(0.015)
fraud 0.263
(0.558)
theft -1.181***
(0.001)
robbery -0.208
(0.726)
vandalism -0.232
(0.580)
Constant 29.02** 35.27** 35.92** 29.41 55.33***
(0.016) (0.049) (0.028) (0.104) (0.000)
NObs 90 85 85 81 79
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; p-values in parentheses
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expeted reidivism onrming our initial assumption. The best model for age is
a quadrati expression, resulting in a monotonously dereasing and onvex fun-
tion. The nonlinear urve thus aptures a general negative trend and a dereasing
marginal hange, both of whih are in line with the literature. Further, we nd
that the propensity to reidivate dereases when the inmate has a job oer or
at least job ontats (job ontat). The negative inuene of job opportunity on
reidivism onrms the literature whih nds broad evidene that worse general
job market onditions inrease rime rates (Fougère et al., 2009; Lin, 2008; Mahin
and Meghir, 2004; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001). In line with intuition, we
nd riminal bakground in the family (riminal family), poor soial apital and
the number of prison years previous to the present stay to be positively orrelated
with reidivism. When inluding dummy variables for the type of rime ommit-
ted, only drug dealing (drugs) and theft turn out to be a signiant determinant
of reidivism. Also, nationality and eduation seems to matter. Germans are as-
soiated with a higher and high shool degree holders with a lower probability of
reidivism.
In the treatment equation we use the same ontrols exept for the dierent
age variables, whih represent our exlusion restrition. Moreover, we exlude all
variables that are determined as a onsequene of treatment seletion, like sentene
length, job ontat or month in prison. Previous prison experiene is negatively
orrelated with treatment assignment while the number of previous trials (riminal
reord) does not seem to aet the likelihood of being sent to a riminal prison.
When ontrolling for types of rime only robbery, vandalism and drug dealing are
signiant fators. It seems to meet intution, that these three types of rime are
assoiated with juvenile law. While robbery allows for smaller minimum santions
in juvenile law and thus ould be a strategi hoie of the judges, the other two have
an immature onnotation whih is onsistent with judges applying the maturitiy
riterion.
To failitate interpretation and omparison between the subsequent regres-
sion disontinuity design, we also report the average treatment eets. Following
Christodes et al. (1997) and Greene (1998), the onditional means of a dummy
variable are idential to the univariate probit ase and is determined by (12).
Hene, the average treatment eet an be omputed as the average value of the
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Table 3: Biprobit Equation 2: Treatment assignment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
rim.law rim.law rim.law rim.law rim.law
ageoense 0.921*** 0.904*** 0.880*** 1.125*** 1.204***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
riminal family -0.058 -0.312 -0.171 0.129
(0.891) (0.422) (0.507) (0.826)
soial ontat 0.601 1.109** 1.539*
(0.190) (0.019) (0.076)
poor soial apital 0.835 0.916* 1.210**
(0.117) (0.086) (0.021)
prison experiene -8.782*** -4.326***
(0.000) (0.000)
prison years 0.119** -0.352
(0.028) (0.187)
riminal reord 0.049 -0.004
(0.507) (0.953)
german -0.984
(0.168)
high shool 0.913
(0.269)
drugs -4.004***
(0.000)
fraud -0.065
(0.849)
theft -0.326
(0.541)
robbery -5.834***
(0.000)
vandalism -7.073***
(0.000)
Constant -19.48*** -19.12*** -19.48*** -24.82*** -25.48***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rho 0.396 0.623 0.699* 1.000*** 1.000***
(0.154) (0.226) (0.075) (0.000) (0.000)
ATE -0.290** -0.340*** -0.355*** -0.320*** -0.267***
(0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
NObs 90 85 85 81 79
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; p-values in parentheses
standard errors of ATE omputed using delta method
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individual hanges in the likelihood of reidivism, indued by the treatment:
ATE = Pr(ER1 = 1|X)− Pr(ER0 = 1|X)
ÂTE = 1
N
∑N
i=1
[
Φ(Xiβ̂ + δ̂)− Φ(Xiβ̂)
]
(12)
where δ̂ is the estimated oeient of riminal law treatment and β̂ ontains
the estimates of the remaining oeients of the respetive model. The estimated
treatment eet is robust aross model speiations and indiates a drop in re-
idivism of roughly 25-35% (ATE).
5.1 Robustness Cheks
In addition to the presented results, we performed several robustness heks whih
are briey summarized in this subsetion. First, we also estimated a bivariate
ordered probit version of the model. The extension of the desribed speiation
is straightforward. The results onrm the estimates, inreasing the robustness of
our ndings.
Seond, we onjet that juvenile law might aet expeted reidivism dierently
depending on whether it is still appliable when the inmate is released from prison.
One way to test this hypothesis is to hek whether there is an additional eet
when the age when leaving supersedes 21. If the inmate an expet to leave
prison after turning 21, he an be sure that riminal law will be applied in ase
of reoending. This ould result in a dierent probability of reidivism when
ompared to a subjet that leaves prison before turning 21 (the same logi applies
at 18). We tested for this possibility by inluding both age when leaving and
a dummy if this age was smaller than 21. However, the regressors were almost
never signiant and did not hange our estimates of the ausal eet of riminal
law on reidivism. This might be due to the fat that we are mainly analyzing
adolesents and thus most of them are already older than 21 when leaving prison
(average leaving age is 23.5 years). In addition, there is some unertainty with
regard to the atual point in time when the inmate leaves the prison sine the
law inludes the possibility of early release ( 57, 57a, 57b German Penal Code -
Strafgesetzbuh).
Third, even though the estimates for rho are almost positive and mostly signif-
21
iant, we also performed a sensitivity analysis in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005)
to better understand the importane of unobserved variables. Hene, we added
onstraints on rho setting it to a xed value. When foring rho to be zero, in
fat, we estimate a single equation probit model. It shows that when ignoring a
potential bias aused by the judges seletion, we get a negative estimate of the
eet of riminal law on reidivism whih however is not statistially dierent from
zero. This onrms the oial register survey data in Germany (see Jehle et al.,
2003), whih found a higher share of reidivating young oenders if they have been
sentened under juvenile law. When allowing rho to be higher, the eet of rimi-
nal law beomes more signiant and larger in size. The orresponding estimation
tables are provided in the appendix (tables 6 to 9).
6 Regression Disontinuity Design
In a seond step, we hek whether the results from the bivariate probit estimations
an be onrmed in a regression disontinuity (RD) approah. Introdued by
psyhologists Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960), RD did not draw too muh
of the attention in the eonomi literature until the late 1990s.
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RD avoids the
problem of a seletion bias by taking advantage of a disontinuity in treatment
assignment. Instead of dierening onditional means based on treatment status,
here we ontrast means based on a dummy variable that aptures whether the
individual has passed the ut-o point or not. Following Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) we estimate the average treatment eet by
ÂTE = E [β|(Xi = c)] =
limx↓cE[ERi|Xi=x]−limx↑cE[ERi|Xi=x]
limx↓cE[Ti|Xi=x]−limx↑cE[Ti|Xi=x]
= α̂ERr−α̂ERl
α̂Tr−α̂Tl
(13)
where Xi is the variable ageoense and c is the ut-o point where the treat-
ment assignment funtion jumps. In our setting, the global treatment assignment
funtion (7) suggests two potential disontinuities: at 18 and 21 years of age at
oense. This means that we will ompare individuals who are 18 (21) or a little
14
Today, however, there is a growing body of literature on RD appliations initiated by Angrist
and Lavy (1999) and Blak (1999) amongst others. Lee and Lemieux (2010) provide a good survey
on this emerging strand of the empirial literature.
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older to their peers a little younger than 18 (21). The numerator of the estimator
is the dierene in limits of the value of the dependent variable at the ut-o point,
approximated both from the left and the right. More intuitively, α̂ERr − α̂ERl is
the dierene in the estimated interepts when regressing estimated reidivism on
age at oense, where the variable ageoffense has been entered around the ut-
o point: α̂ERr is the interept when taking into aount only observations with
an age above the ut-o and α̂ERl is the interept when using only those below
the ut-o age. The same intuition holds for the denominator, whih represents
the dierenes in the limit of treatment probability from both sides of the ut-
os. These limits an be represented as the estimated interepts α̂Tr and α̂T l,
stemming from regressions of the treatment indiator T on the entered variable
ageoffense. Dividing by the dierene in treatment probability an be seen as
a normalization whih yields the treatment eet as if all subjets got the treat-
ment.
15
This normalization is neessary sine, in our fuzzy setting, the jump in
treatment probability is expeted to be smaller than 1 at both ut-os.
16
Underlying this identiation strategy is the assumption that unobservable
harateristis do not vary disontinuously at the ut-o points while treatment
assignment does. Identiation is possible when omparing only those individuals
suiently lose to the ut-o point (see Van der Klaauw (2008) for a formal
derivation). Hene, the optimal bandwidth around the ut-o point needs to be
suiently small, but needs to take into aount that inreased omparability
omes at the prie of dereased sample size. We alulate the optimal bandwidth
aording to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) yielding a size of 2 years. In
addition, we also apply dierent bandwidths to inrease the robustness of the
estimates.
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Note the similarity of this onept to a well-known Wald estimator in an instrumental
variable approah. As was rst pointed out by Hahn et al. (2001), the property having passed
the ut-o point an be interpreted as an instrument for treatment assignment. In this sense
the denominator of (13) is the result of the rst stage regression of riminal law on age at oense
while in the numerator we have the seond stage regression of expeted reidivism on a list of
variables inluding age at oense.
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Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), RD an be applied in two possible settings, if treat-
ment assignment hanges from zero to one at the uto, then this is the sharp ase. If the
probability of treatment assignment hanges disontinuously, but the hange is smaller than one
following the literature we have a fuzzy design. This is also the ase in our setting.
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6.1 Comparability of treatment and ontrol group and self
seletion
To test for omparability of the sample on both sides of the ut-os we ontrast
the observable harateristis. More speially we perform an RD analysis on the
single observable variables and hek whether any of them exhibits disontinuities.
The results of this analysis an be found in the appendix (table 10).
Looking at the treatment (riminal law), we see that there is no signiant
dierene at the ut-o of 18. Even though judges an apply riminal law one the
oender has turned 18 when ommitting the rime, our data show that they rarely
do so. Looking at 21, however, we an rejet the hypothesis of no disontinuity in
treatment assignment. We nd a jump from around 25% just before 21, to 100%
after 21. Given the fat that we do not have a disontinuity at 18 years, we will
onentrate our analysis at 21 years. Moreover, individuals in Germany beome
of age at 18 and thus many unobservables might also hange at this age, therefore
even if we found something at 18 we would not be sure to identify the treatment
eet.
17
Looking at the disontinuities of the other variables, our observations ertainly
dier in terms of age. In addition, more individuals just below 21 seem to have
riminal family. Sentene length is also inreasing signiantly after 21, whih is
also reeted by a higher number of months already spent in prison. Moreover,
younger individuals seem to be assoiated with more juvenile rimes. Here we
nd signiant dierenes for theft and vandalism.
These disontinuities might have some eet on reidivism. Therefore we will
subsequently ontrol for these and other variables in order to assure that the
estimated eet on reidivism is driven by the atual treatment.
The identied dierenes do not suggest self seletion based on observables.
However, theoretially there might be perfet sorting based on unobservables whih
we annot analyze. We do not see an argument that would justify self seletion
into treatment, sine this would result in more severe punishment. There ould,
however, be the hane of sorting in the sense that juveniles ommit their rime
17
The age of 18 appears in the plaebo analysis and in fat we observe no disontinuity at 18.
See table 11 for details.
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earlier when milder punishments will still be applied. To test this possibility, we
hek the distribution of observation around the ut-os. If self seletion were an
issue, we should see a peak in density shortly before 18 and shortly before 21, sine
individuals would try to avoid the tougher punishment regime. However, this does
not seem to be the ase (see table 4). Furthermore, empirial evidene suggests
that young oenders are myopi with respet to their punishment (see for example
Lee and MCrary (2009) and Hjalmarsson (2009a)) and highly underestimate the
probability of getting aught. Therefore it seems very unlikely that there is sorting
going on beause the oenders do not expet to be aught, giving further support
for the view that we should not suer from a problem of self seletion.
Table 4: Observations RD bins
ange ageoense 17-18 18-19 19-20 20-21 21-22
NObs 25 30 22 29 27
6.2 Estimated jumps in expeted reidivism
The elements of (13) an be estimated either non-parametrially or loal-linearly.
In addition, further ovariates might be inluded in the regressions. We apply the
RD design using a nonparametri regression and allow for ovariates. Looking at
the data, the ut-o at 21 seems to have a muh stronger appeal than the one at
18. A nonparametri approximation of treatment assignment shows a jump at 21
(of approx. 60 %) but no hange at 18 (see gure 1 or table 10).
Based on this observation, the theoretial hange in treatment assignment at 18
is not an eetive one. Hene, we fous on the seond ut-o point at 21. In table
5, we provide estimates for the average treatment eet as dened in (13) using
dierent speiations and bandwidths. We have 9 dierent speiations: First
we only vary the bandwidth without inluding further ontrols.
18
In a next step
18
The analysis was performed based on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009), however the op-
timal bandwidth of 3.5 years is not appliable to our sample, sine it would also inlude the
theoretial disontinuity at 18.
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Figure 1: Treatment assignment over age at oense
we group our ovariates into three ategories: soioeonomi variables, sentene
related harateristis and rime types. Within these ategories, we distinguish
those variables where we found signiant dierenes, from those that are balaned
aross samples.
The results show a drop in expeted reidivism with a magnitude between 0.2
and 0.4, depending on the bandwidth. While there is some variation when we
hange the bandwidth, all results are ontained in the ondene interval of the
rst estimate. Our results show the magnitude of this drop to be quite robust in
the dierent speiations. For the smallest bandwidth the jump in reidivism is
signiant. Inreasing the bandwidth redues signiane to a level of 12-13%. As
we inlude more ontrols the treatment eet beomes signiant again. Moreover,
even if we inlude all variables that showed signiant disontinuities (from 10)
the point estimate is quite stable although the standard error is a little higher
(see olumn 8). Thus, although we observe disontinuities in some ontrols, they
do not seem to bias our results. Out of nine speiations six show signiant
results and more than half of them exhibit a signiane level below 5%. While
the additional ovariates aet the standard errors, the size of the estimates is
only slightly hanged. This gives an additional indiation that our nding is due
to the treatment hange and not due to some seletion bias. Dividing the jump
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Figure 2: Expeted reidivism over age at oense
in reidivism (diER) by the jump in treatment assignment (diT ) serves as a
normalization and provides the average treatment eets. The results are provided
in table 5 and yield an estimated drop in reidivism of 0.31 to 0.58 if all delinquents
got riminal treatment.
6.3 Robustness Chek: Plaebo estimates
Having found the drop at 21, we want to be sure that it was atually due to a
ausal eet of riminal law on reidivism and not due to other fators. We have
partly heked this already by using dierent bandwidths and ovariates, but we
try to inrease robustness of the estimation by performing plaebo estimates.
Using the same speiations as above, we try to estimate disontinuities in
expeted reidivism for ut-os where no atual law hange in terms of punishment
arises. We perform these plaebo estimates every six months starting from 17 up
to 22 and thus run the nine RD speiations desribed above, using the dierent
bandwidths and ovariates. If we nd signiant eets for some ut-os exept
21, this means that our RD results might as well arise trough unobserved fators
or biases. Sine there is no disontinuous hange in the assignment probability at
the plaebo ut-os, we don't divide by the hange in treatment (the denominator
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Table 5: RD estimates Part A Cut-o 21
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
bdw=1 bdw=2 bdw=2.5 bdw=2.5 bdw=2.5 bdw=2.5 bdw=2.5 bdw=2.5 bdw=2.5
NObs 55 102 131 129 127 125 113 125 113
exp. re 21- 0.264 0.252 0.245 0.315 0.331 0.330 0.303 0.334 0.329
exp. re 21+ -0.038 0.034 0.048 0.002 -0.002 -0.028 -0.049 0.076 0.079
diER -0.301* -0.218 -0.197 -0.313* -0.333* -0.358** -0.351** -0.258 -0.250*
(0.051) (0.126) (0.135) (0.086) (0.071) (0.026) (0.027) (0.117) (0.080)
rim law 21- 0.229 0.350 0.370 0.378 0.393 0.427 0.407 0.458 0.399
rim law 21+ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
diT -0.771 -0.650 -0.630 -0.622 -0.607 -0.573 -0.593 -0.542 -0.601
ATE -0.391* -0.335 -0.313 -0.503** -0.548** -0.625** -0.592** -0.476 -0.415*
(0.061) (0.134) (0.141) (0.042) (0.029) (0.030) (0.043) (0.119) (0.071)
soio eon 1 no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
soio eon 2 no no no no yes no yes no yes
sentene 1 no no no no no yes yes yes yes
sentene 2 no no no no no no yes no yes
rime 1 no no no no no no no yes yes
rime 2 no no no no no no no no yes
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; p-values in parentheses
In group 1 we ontrol for variables with signiant dierenes. More speially:
soio eon (soioeonomi variables) 1: age, age
2
,riminal family; 2: poor soial apital, German nationality
sentene (sentene related variables) 1: sentene length, urrent months in prison; 2: open prison, job ontat, total years in prison
rime (type of rime)1: theft, vandalism; 2: robbery
of 13). We only look at the hange in reidivism. The full estimates an be found
in the appendix (Tables 11 and 12).
Looking at the results of our plaebo estimates, we nd that the ut-o at 21
has the highest level of signiane in most speiations. However, also at 20.5
some of the models show signiant results. Also here we have a negative point
estimate. Te identied drop at 20.5 an be explained by our impreise measure
for age. In fat, this nding even provides further support of our earlier nding
that riminal law dereases reidivism. For all other plaebos at most two out of
nine speiations are signiant. Therefore in sum, the plaebo estimates provide
further robustness to our ndings.
7 Disussion
The main result of our analyses is that the appliation of riminal law does not
stimulate juvenile reidivism, as suggested by many US studies, but rather de-
reases it. Based on the bivariate probit estimates, the treatment riminal law
redues reidivism by about 30%, while the RD approah identies a drop of about
40%. The results of both approahes are thus similar in sign and signiane. It
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is possible that the small dierenes are due to dierent samples underlying the
estimations: While in the bivariate probit model we look at adolesents only, the
regression disontinuity design requires observations beyond the ut-o point (age
21). Hene, individuals in the latter analysis are older on average. In addition, a
regression disontinuity design gives more weight to the observations lose to the
ut-o point and thus only provides a weighted average treatment eet (Lee and
Lemieux, 2010).
In the following two subsetions we rst explore the robustness of our dependent
variable and then relate our ndings to the existing literature.
7.1 Robustness of Expeted Reidivism
To what extent ould the results be driven by a measurement error in the outome
variable? Continuing from the disussion in setion 3.1, our proxy for reidivism
might be subjet to a bias. What ould be the diretion of suh an eet? In
juvenile prisons, there are more shooling possibilities and personal ustodians.
Along with general eduation also rime deterrene eduation might take plae,
potentially leading to a temporary underestimation of the real rate of reidivism.
In ontrast, one might also think of stronger peer pressure in juvenile prisons whih
might lead to ompetition in toughness and an exaggerated report of reidivism.
While the rst ase would lead to an underestimation of the treatment eet, the
seond ase might result in an issue. However, if suh a peer eet exists, it is
likely to not only aet self-reported measures of reidivism but might also drive
the real behavior after release (see e.g. Bayer et al., 2009). Hene, we annot nd
a onvining argument that would damage our results. Furthermore, due to the
fat that we nd so few individuals who onsider themselves ertain to reoend
(only 4% in our sample), an exaggerated report of reidivism is unlikely to be the
ase.
7.2 Reoniliation with US ndings
The question arises why our results are so dierent from the US evidene on ju-
veniles transferred to riminal ourts. A possible way to reonile the dierent
ndings is the assumption of a non-monotoni relationship between harshness and
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reidivism. In this view, inreasing the severeness of punishment an ause dier-
ent reations depending on its present level. In fat, there is also evidene from the
US whih nds redued juvenile reidivism after striter santions. Hjalmarsson
(2009b) shows that inareration in juvenile failities an be an eetive measure
in ombating juvenile rime as opposed to even milder punishments suh as a pro-
bation or a ne. She argues that, in the ase of the US Amerian juvenile prisons
she analyzes, the deterrent eet seems to outweigh the drawbaks of inarera-
tion, in partiular its stigma and potential peer eets. A similar argument might
hold for German riminal prisons when ompared to juvenile prisons, where the
net eet of a harsher environment seems to be that riminal behavior on the part
of adolesent inmates is disouraged.
Combining the results with the reported eets of tougher US transfer laws
would then suggest, at least for adolesents, a U-shaped pattern of the relation-
ship between harshness of punishment and reidivism. Keeping this piture in
mind, German prisons seem to be to the left of the minimum point - and thus
inareration in harsher riminal prisons results in redued reidivism. US rimi-
nal prisons, on the other hand, seem to be to the right of the minimum already -
and thus more harshness inreases reidivism. The results from Chen and Shapiro
(2007) lend further support to this hypothesis by showing that inreased harshness
in US riminal prisons is likely to result in inreased reidivism. This explanation
would indiate generally striter santions in the US when ompared to Germany
(or Europe in general) - a view whih seems to nd support in the literature. As
Whitman (2003) writes in the introdution to his book on the dierene between
the legal systems in the two ontinents, riminal punishment in Ameria is harsh
and degrading - more so than anywhere else in the liberal west. Based on this
assessment, in the US system adolesents are generally punished more severely,
espeially after ending up in riminal prison, and therefore might not be able to
reintegrate into soiety afterwards. In ontrast, the German system is rather mild
and sees inareration as the ultima ratio, espeially for juveniles.
Seond, the observed reations might also hinge on the age of the individuals
in the sample. While US transfer laws usually refer to 16 or 17-year-old oenders,
we base our analysis on individuals older than 18. The optimal level of harshness
might depend on the age of the oender. Put dierently, the relative gains from
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harsh santions might inrease with age, whih ould be explained by the limited
deterrent eets for (myopi) adolesents found by Lee and MCrary (2009).
Another potential driver of riminal behavior is peer eets. As reported by
Bayer et al. (2009), inareration an enfore subsequent riminal behavior, es-
peially for individuals with similar rime types. The dierene in results might
thus be aused by stronger peer eets in German juvenile prisons when ompared
to their US ounterparts. However, even though the German haraterization
of inareration as ultima ratio might lead to a more negative seletion of the
toughest guys, we do not see why peer pressure should be stronger than in the
US.
8 Conlusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the impat of santion type on inmates' expeta-
tions of their subsequent riminal behavior. To overome the identied bias due to
the seletion proess into riminal law, we rst used a bivariate probit model that
provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment oeient, given that the model is
orretly speied. In a seond step, we exploited the fat that in Germany there
are two potential jumps in the probability of being sentened under riminal law.
By taking advantage of the disontinuity at the age of 21, we isolated the ausal
impat of riminal law on expeted reidivism in a regression disontinuity design.
The results from both approahes suggest that being sentened under riminal
law disourages young people from reidivism. This nding is in stark ontrast to
the literature on US transfer laws and shows that the legal framework in Germany
seems to be substantially dierent from its North Amerian ounterpart.
Moreover, our results have impliations for juvenile legislation aross Europe.
The Committee of Ministers of the Counil of Europe is trying to establish Euro-
pean standards of juvenile law and refers to the German rules as a good example
(see memorandum CM(2003)109 to reommendation Re(2003)20). Speially,
Re(2008)11 European Rules for Juvenile Oenders Subjet to Santions and
Measures suggests an extended appliation of juvenile law for adolesents. Our
results question the optimality of this poliy - at least for the ase of inareration.
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Table 6: Biprobit Equation 1: Drivers of expeted reidivism (rho=0.5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
reidivism reidivism reidivism reidivism reidivism
age -2.642** -3.506*** -3.674*** -3.662** -6.791***
(0.029) (0.009) (0.006) (0.023) (0.000)
age2 0.062** 0.081*** 0.085*** 0.085** 0.154***
(0.033) (0.010) (0.006) (0.025) (0.000)
riminal law -1.316** -1.417** -1.477** -1.128* -1.038
(0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.091) (0.202)
job ontat -0.509*** -0.523*** -0.579*** -0.898***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
riminal family 0.461*** 0.409*** 0.453* 1.483**
(0.006) (0.000) (0.096) (0.015)
soial ontat 0.074 -0.217 -0.730**
(0.848) (0.494) (0.026)
poor soial apital 0.387 0.352 0.674*
(0.143) (0.248) (0.088)
prison experiene 0.014 1.201
(0.981) (0.130)
prison years 0.254** 0.304*
(0.018) (0.052)
riminal reord 0.0252 0.0187
(0.272) (0.275)
open 0.767** 1.090***
(0.025) (0.009)
sentene length 0.075
(0.564)
months in prison -0.011
(0.545)
german 3.103***
(0.001)
high shool -4.632***
(0.000)
drugs 0.794***
(0.000)
fraud 0.295
(0.542)
theft -1.158***
(0.001)
robbery 0.0164
(0.982)
vandalism -0.309
(0.499)
Constant 27.71** 37.36*** 39.10*** 38.65** 70.67***
(0.028) (0.010) (0.007) (0.025) (0.000)
NObs 90 85 85 81 79
Constraint: rho=0.5
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; p-values in parentheses
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Table 7: Biprobit Equation 2: Treatment assignment (rho=0.5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
rim.law rim.law rim.law rim.law rim.law
ageoense 0.907*** 0.918*** 0.914*** 1.253*** 1.474***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
riminal family -0.086 -0.342 -0.065 -0.047
(0.827) (0.343) (0.818) (0.934)
soial ontat 0.562 0.752 1.339
(0.273) (0.213) (0.209)
poor soial apital 0.872* 1.123* 1.467
(0.089) (0.054) (0.117)
prison experiene -6.983*** -5.183***
(0.000) (0.000)
prison years 0.190*** 0.217
(0.000) (0.329)
riminal reord 0.038 -0.003
(0.439) (0.966)
german -0.752
(0.346)
high shool 0.693
(0.433)
drugs -5.784***
(0.000)
fraud -0.216
(0.665)
theft -0.724
(0.404)
robbery -7.589***
(0.000)
vandalism -5.096***
(0.000)
Constant -19.20*** -19.39*** -20.15*** -27.23*** -30.90***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
Rho 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
ATE -0.311*** -0.318*** -0.323*** -0.252** -0.178
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.030) (0.149)
NObs 90 85 85 81 79
Constraint: rho=0.5
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; p-values in parentheses
standard errors of ATE omputed using delta method
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Table 8: Biprobit Equation 1: Drivers of expeted reidivism (rho=0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
reidivism reidivism reidivism reidivism reidivism
age -3.009** -3.864*** -3.969*** -3.623** -6.811***
(0.015) (0.005) (0.003) (0.040) (0.000)
age2 0.069** 0.089*** 0.091*** 0.083** 0.154***
(0.021) (0.007) (0.004) (0.045) (0.000)
riminal law -0.614 -0.708 -0.773 -0.523 -0.465
(0.364) (0.312) (0.274) (0.504) (0.612)
job ontat -0.526*** -0.530*** -0.630*** -0.965***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
riminal family 0.489*** 0.463*** 0.470* 1.490**
(0.004) (0.000) (0.078) (0.012)
soial ontat 0.018 -0.256 -0.740**
(0.963) (0.421) (0.025)
poor soial apital 0.270 0.258 0.564
(0.354) (0.431) (0.180)
prison experiene 0.106 1.255
(0.857) (0.103)
prison years 0.257** 0.305**
(0.016) (0.035)
riminal reord 0.0259 0.0169
(0.278) (0.176)
open 0.790** 1.139***
(0.027) (0.004)
sentene length 0.072
(0.576)
months in prison -0.009
(0.605)
german 3.132***
(0.000)
high shool -4.314***
(0.000)
drugs 0.819***
(0.000)
fraud 0.301
(0.531)
theft -1.142***
(0.002)
robbery 0.110
(0.878)
vandalism -0.314
(0.473)
Constant 32.02** 41.59*** 42.66*** 38.56** 71.19***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.002) (0.041) (0.000)
NObs 90 85 85 81 79
Constraint: rho=0
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; p-values in parentheses
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Table 9: Biprobit Equation 2: Treatment assignment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
rim.law rim.law rim.law rim.law rim.law
ageoense 0.937*** 0.915*** 0.916*** 1.188*** 1.506***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
riminal family -0.184 -0.379 0.048 -0.313
(0.673) (0.259) (0.843) (0.471)
soial ontat 0.410 0.484 0.980
(0.467) (0.450) (0.338)
poor soial apital 0.880 1.076* 1.344
(0.115) (0.086) (0.187)
prison experiene -6.593*** -4.722***
(0.000) (0.000)
prison years 0.160*** 0.155
(0.000) (0.479)
riminal reord 0.012 -0.014
(0.817) (0.838)
german -0.701
(0.412)
high shool 0.414
(0.641)
drugs -5.809***
(0.000)
fraud -0.445
(0.400)
theft -0.971
(0.315)
robbery -7.588***
(0.000)
vandalism -4.691***
(0.000)
Constant -19.80*** -19.34*** -20.09*** -25.61*** -31.04***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)
Rho 0 0 0 0 0
ATE -0.177 -0.192 -0.204 -0.136 -0.090
(0.274) (0.218) (0.175) (0.456) (0.601)
NObs 90 85 85 81 79
Constraint: rho=0
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; p-values in parentheses
standard errors of ATE omputed using delta method
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Table 10: Disontinuities at 21 and 18
dis. 21 pval dis. 18 pval
reidivism -0.197 (0.136) 0.141 (0.450)
riminal law 0.630*** (0.000) 0.000 (-)
age 2.534*** (0.004) -0.090 (0.835)
german -0.184 (0.209) -0.045 (0.791)
high shool 0.133 (0.224) 0.047 (0.441)
soial ontat -0.190 (0.294) 0.210 (0.243)
poor soial apital 0.016 (0.932) -0.373** (0.038)
riminal family -0.171** (0.034) -0.120 (0.394)
prison experiene -0.032 (0.847) -0.163 (0.299)
prison years 0.943 (0.248) -0.311 (0.442)
riminal reord 0.898 (0.469) -4.001** (0.023)
job ontat -0.004 (0.983) -0.153 (0.410)
open 0.081 (0.476) 0.188* (0.085)
sentene length 2.871* (0.063) -0.430 (0.593)
months in prison 31.993** (0.005) -1.352 (0.757)
drugs -0.048 (0.602) 0.292** (0.038)
fraud 0.107 (0.479) 0.112 (0.422)
theft -0.383** (0.017) -0.427** (0.016)
robbery -0.075 (0.661) -0.023 (0.904)
vandalism -0.234** (0.015) -0.186 (0.192)
standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 11: Plaebo estimates (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
17 -0.109 -0.091 -0.045 -0.096 -0.208 -0.040 -0.175 -0.148 -0.515*
(0.636) (0.647) (0.814) (0.631) (0.267) (0.818) (0.335) (0.381) (0.061)
NObs 43 80 89 85 84 83 74 83 74
17.5 0.119 0.125 0.162 0.204 0.212 0.146 0.091 0.133 0.117
(0.746) (0.577) (0.413) (0.349) (0.252) (0.483) (0.635) (0.514) (0.551)
NObs 50 85 101 97 96 95 85 95 85
18 0.136 0.175 0.141 0.162 0.181 0.117 0.210 0.161 0.231
(0.613) (0.396) (0.449) (0.410) (0.371) (0.546) (0.233) (0.435) (0.239)
NObs 53 93 107 103 102 101 91 101 91
18.5 0.241 0.073 0.053 0.137 0.130 0.154 -0.079 0.059 -0.094
(0.449) (0.719) (0.777) (0.450) (0.486) (0.377) (0.583) (0.671) (0.540)
NObs 49 96 122 118 117 116 104 116 104
19 0.157 -0.071 -0.092 -0.107 -0.091 -0.205 -0.212 -0.230 -0.212
(0.626) (0.730) (0.614) (0.578) (0.643) (0.237) (0.128) (0.173) (0.177)
NObs 50 103 126 122 121 119 107 119 107
RD estimates of diER, olumns represent model speiations as in table 5
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 12: Plaebo estimates (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
19.5 -0.056 0.026 -0.002 0.010 0.016 -0.043 -0.027 -0.075 -0.024
(0.810) (0.890) (0.991) (0.964) (0.945) (0.843) (0.883) (0.734) (0.902)
NObs 46 101 129 126 125 123 112 123 112
20 0.463 0.305 0.265 0.181 0.203 0.182 0.100 0.173 0.107
(0.102) (0.110) (0.122) (0.220) (0.172) (0.187) (0.688) (0.210) (0.671)
NObs 50 105 130 127 126 124 113 124 113
20.5 -0.288 -0.179 -0.144 -0.333** -0.417*** -0.307* -0.793* -0.304** -0.725
(0.224) (0.320) (0.374) (0.019) (0.004) (0.053) (0.084) (0.045) (0.102)
NObs 52 105 131 129 128 124 113 124 113
21.5 0.322** 0.163 0.144 0.139 0.139 0.145 0.128 0.152 0.197*
(0.041) (0.220) (0.239) (0.285) (0.279) (0.318) (0.283) (0.259) (0.077)
NObs 59 107 130 128 126 124 112 124 112
22 -0.060 0.154 0.140 0.158 0.199 0.168 0.197 0.074 0.117
(0.640) (0.274) (0.294) (0.262) (0.190) (0.195) (0.157) (0.556) (0.356)
NObs 52 109 138 136 134 132 119 132 119
22.5 0.234 0.213 0.202 0.218 0.231 0.181 0.265 0.164 0.187
(0.291) (0.216) (0.195) (0.166) (0.137) (0.228) (0.128) (0.206) (0.215)
NObs 55 116 135 133 131 128 116 128 116
RD estimates of diER, olumns represent model speiations as in table 5
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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